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and other centres of Moslem resistance, are still known as the 'Grave 
of Thousands', and the 'Grave of Tens of thousands'. Indeed, in terms 
both of duration and intensity, this rebellion was undoubtedly one of 
the most protracted and brutal, not only in nineteenth-century China, 
but in the whole of Chinese history. 
The Yunnan Moslem Rebellion, as you well know, was not the only 
such upheaval in China during this period. The nineteenth century, 
marked by the White Lotus Rebellion at the beginning, to the Boxer 
outbreak at the close, saw China torn by almost continuous uprisings 
and rebellions at a time when she was also threatened by foreign 
invasions - the best known of these internal upheavals being the 
Taiping Rebellion (1849-1864), the Nien Rebellion (1853-1868), 
the Miao Rebellion (1854-1872), the Moslem Rebellion of the 
Northwest (1862-1873) and the Yunnan Rebellion. I shall not dwell on 
the causes common to all these outbreaks, but rather limit myself to 
some special features of the Yunnan Rebellion and what the present 
controversy is all about. 
To the Chinese, the word 'hui-hui', denoting 'Moslems', does not 
signify all those of the Islamic faith. There are many national minorities 
in China, especially in Xinjiang province, who practise Islam, yet who 
are not regarded as 'Hui' people. The term 'hui-hui' applies only to a 
particular ethnic group of Islamic people. Some of you who have been 
to Beijing may have been to one of the restaurants that now line one of 
the city's better-known thoroughfares, Wangfujing Dajie, widely known 
in former days as Morrison Street, after the celebrated Australian who 
once lived there. The cooks and waiters in some of these restaurants are 
indistinguishable in physique, dress and language from the Han Chinese, 
and you would not know they were Moslems except for a small wooden 
board hanging outside, with the Chinese words 'hui-hui' or 'Moslems 
from the Western Regions' in Arabic script. These are the Moslems or 
Hui people to whom I am referring here; they have become in-
distinguishable from other Chinese as a result of a long historical 
process. 
Moslems in China are of two origins. By far the largest group to 
come to China were Central Asians and Near Eastern peoples, such as 
Persians, Arabs, and others, who arrived in the first part of the thirteenth 
century in the wake of the Mongol conquest, particularly during the 
period from _Chinggis Khan's invasion in 1219 to Hulegu's occupation 
of Baghdad in 1258.6 During this period, various Moslem kingdoms and 
tribes in the vast territory to the west of the Belaturh Mountains and 
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east of the Black Sea were brought under Mongol domination. With 
each conquest, inhabitants in the conquered territory were dispatched 
en masse to the east. 7 With official encouragement, these were later 
joined by traders, artisans and others. In the official documents of the 
Yuan Dynasty they were referred to as 'hui-hui', and were listed side 
by side with other ethnic groups such as Han, Naiman, Uighur, Tangut, 
Khitan, and so on. In their enforced exile, many of these prisoners 
enlisted as soldiers, while others worked as artisans and farmers, and a 
small number became government officials, merchants and preachers. 
All of them referred to themselves by the term the Mongols used, 
'hui-hui'. 
The smaller group of Moslems were mostly merchants who had come 
to China at the beginning of the Tang dynasty in the seventh century. 
It was recorded by an Arab traveller that there were more than one 
hundred and twenty thousand Arabs, Persians and Jews living in Canton 
at the time when Huangchao captured this international port in 879.8 
Despite their long residence in China, the Moslems descended from 
these West Asian settlers are not regarded as 'hui-hui', nor indeed, did 
they add significantly to the total Moslem population in China. Equally 
insignificant are the numbers of Han, Mongol, Uighur, and other ethnic 
peoples who were converted to the Islamic faith through marriage and 
other social and economic processes. 
Upon the overthrow of the alien Mongol rule in 1368, the Ming 
rulers ushered in a period of intensive nationalism. Among the first 
edicts of the first emperor, Daizu, were those proscribing the use of 
foreign clothing, language and names.9 In 1372, a proclamation was 
issued, forbidding intermarriage among the Mongols and their former 
allied peoples, encouraging instead intermarriage between all these and 
the Han Chinese, on the ground that they were now all Chinese 
subjects. The punishment for offenders against such prohibitions was 
confiscation of property and enslavement. 10 This system of inter-
marriage not only resulted in the growth of the number of the Chinese 
Moslems, but also made them increasingly less foreign through their 
gradual adoption of the Chinese pattern of living, except in the crucial 
areas of diet and religious practices. Moslems began to adopt mono-
syllabic Chinese names by selecting certain syllables of their original 
names; hence Maharnmed became Ma, Nasir became Na, Sayed became 
Sai and so on, in conformity with the traditional Chinese so-called 'one 
hundred surnames' .11 They also adopted Chinese dress and gradually 
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local Chinese dialects began to replace Arabic and Persian, only a few 
phrases and terms being preserved for use on religious occasions and in 
speaking among themselves. 
When the massive migration from Central Asia took place, the Han 
Chinese had long been living on the land the Moslems were to settle. 
The newcomers were therefore unable to congregate in any one place 
as a single entity, nor were they encouraged to do so.12 In fact, it was 
a deliberate policy of the successive dynasties of Ming and Qing to 
disperse these forced immigrants to localities and regions widely 
separated from one another, and compel them to live interspersed 
among Han Chinese and other ethnic groups. This policy was particularly 
strictly enforced under the Qing dnasty. It was common practice, even 
after the middle of the last century, to up-root forcibly whole rural 
Moslem communities and transport them to regions thousands of miles 
away in complete disregard of environment, climate, living conditions 
and work opportunities.13 
But despite these and other repressive measures, the Chinese 
Moslems always tried wherever possible to keep together and to keep to 
themselves. This physical separateness, whether in a street, in a city or a 
village in a rural area, enabled them to retain a certain separate cultural 
and social identity. One interesting and distinctive feature was that, in 
order to ensure communication between settlements, Moslems always 
chose to live by main roads or rivers. Their concentration along the 
banks of the Grand Canal is a good illustration of this long tradition.14 
They tended also, by force of circumstance more than by choice, to 
settle in thinly populated areas. This explains the high percentage of 
Moslems in the north-western and south-western provinces of China. 
Before the middle of the last century, the ratio of Moslems to Han 
Chinese was as high as seven to three in Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai 
and three to seven in Shaanxi.15 But these numbers were sharply 
depleted following the slaughter by the Qing army under Zuo Zongtang 
during the suppression campaign against the Moslems of the northwest 
in 1862-1873. After this, Shaanxi ceased to be an area of concentration 
of Moslem population, which was reduced from an estimate of over one 
million to some twenty thousand. Zuo Zongtang, whom Morrison and 
others described as one of the greatest butchers of modern times, even 
boasted that: 'At present, except for some twenty thousand or so still 
living in Xian, the whole Moslem population of Shaanxi has been 
wiped out family by family leaving no heirs to speak of. Nine-tenths 
of them died by the sword, through epidemic or starvation. It is indeed 
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the greatest catastrophe for Moslems for more than a thousand years' .16 
According to an estimate made in 1953, the figure for Moslems in 
Shaanxi was then little more than fifty thousand,17 or less than 5 per 
cent of the number of nearly a hundred years before. 
The present Moslem population in Yunnan is estimated at a little 
over two hundred thousand, 18 or about 10 per cent of that before the 
Rebellion over a hundred years ago. The ancestors of these Moslems 
went to Yunnan in the thirteenth century under the Mongols as 
military colonists.19 It was they who fust brought the land under 
cultivation; and tillers of the soil formed by far the largest component 
of the Moslem population in Yunnan.20 As owners of the land, some 
Moslems also became owners of mines, particularly copper and silver 
mines.21 And partly because of their adventurous spirit, many became 
traders, especially in the caravan trade with Burma which was virtually 
in their hands.22 Some of the more successful of these traders 
reinvested their profits in farrnland.23 
This little bit of background is necessary because although insofar as 
it was an ethnic conflict, the Yunnan Rebellion was the culmination of 
an antipathy between Moslems and Han Chinese rooted in long-standing 
political and economic discrimination, the immediate causes of the 
spontaneous uprising in 1855 are to be found in disputes involving 
land, mines and, indirectly, overland trade. As early colonists, the 
Moslems, naturally enough, established their farms wherever possible 
within easy reach of the water supply .24 Moslem traders also invested 
their profits in such land. This rankled with many Han Chinese who, 
with their traditional chauvinism, regarded their Moslem compatriots 
as they would alien intruders, though they themselves were even more 
recent newcomers to Yunnan.25 With the. connivance or active support 
of local Han officials, efforts were made to dislodge the Moslems from 
their possessions, both farming land and mines.26 This explains why 
ethnic conflicts occurred more often than not in the fertile plains. In 
essence the revolts by the Yunnan Moslems were as much a struggle 
against economic persecution as for ethnic survival. 
These features have long been recognised by Chinese historians who, 
whatever their political persuasion, blamed the Yunnan Rebellion on 
the Qing government's discriminatory and oppressive racial policy. At 
first, historians in the People's Republic went even further, and 
acknowledged the rebel leaders as heroes, awarding them, along with 
the leaders of other rebellions elsewhere, an honoured place in the 
pantheon of national worthies. 21 
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But all this suddenly changed in 1955, a century after the outbreak 
of the rebellion. A revised version of the events made by a leading and 
respected historian of Modem China alleged that the hitherto revered 
leader of the Yunnan Rebellion, Du Wenxiu, was in fact a traitor. 
According to this version, the British government, which had been 
attempting to invade Yunnan by way of Burma since 1858, sent spies 
to Dall to conspire with Du Wenxiu. In 1871, Du Wenxiu sent his 
adopted son, Aishan, to London with a view to betraying Yunnan. 
Making use of the reactionary banner of 'Pan-Islamism', the British 
government directed Aishan to Turkey to work out the concrete 
conditions of the betrayal, but thanks to the all-out offensive by the 
Qing army, the plan was frustrated in time. Du Wenxiu was a Chinese, it 
is said, yet conspired against the motherland, the province and the 
different groups of nationalities of Yunnan; so, from the day he 
colluded with the British aggressors, he was no longer the representative 
of the forces of a righteous cause, but a traitor to his country and to 
that cause. The rebel forces had, on this account, been manipulated by 
Du Wenxiu, if they suffered massacre at the hands of the Qing army, 
they deserved their defeat - though their fate may deserve our 
sympathy.2s 
An accusation of this kind is serious at any time. It was unthinkable 
in the political climate in which it was made. Exhibits in praise of the 
heroic deeds of the rebels were hastily withdrawn and others with 
condemnatory labels substituted. Since in China at that time, pro-
nouncements on intellectual affairs made by those in authority were 
sacrosanct, no defence or refutation, however well documented, was 
allowed. 
I have already contributed something to the debate, and I hope the 
details of my recent findings will further help towards a solution of 
this controversy. Since the accusation against Du Wenxiu and the 
rebellion he led, arose out of the mission to London of his supposedly 
adopted son, Aishan, I shall now try to examine the evidence upon 
which this accusation was based. 
The Aishan Mission of 1872 is better known as the Panthay Mission, 
about which a great deal has already been written - 'Panthay' being the 
term used by the Burmese when referring to Chinese Moslems in 
Yunnan.29 The name 'Aishan' is simply the transliteration of Hassan, 
or Prince Hassan, for it was by this title that British officials in Burma 
commended to the home government in London a young Chinese 
Moslem whose otherwise mundane name was Liu Daoheng.3 0 One can 
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only guess at the reasons for this transformation. It may have been that 
the British officials who sponsored this mission thought it might other-
wise sound too ordinary to attract the necessary attention of the men 
in Whitehall, or indeed even to justify his being despatched all the way 
to London at official expense. At any rate, until he made his abrupt 
appearance in government exchanges between Burma, India and 
London under this ennobled disguise, nothing is known of Liu Daoheng 
beyond the little that can be gleaned from the records the British in 
Burma kept and from one document, said to have been a memorial he 
submitted to Du Wenxiu in October 1870.31 
In it, Liu is shown to be a self-made man of considerable ambition, 
who made up for his lack of formal education by his obvious energy 
and determination. For fifteen years, it appears, he had been constantly 
on the move, travelling extensively through China's southern and 
eastern provinces. He witnessed the upheavals brought about by the 
Taiping and Nien Rebellions, as well as the invasion by Anglo-French 
forces. He was deeply impressed by these foreign invaders who, having 
won the war of 1856-1857, had advanced towards the north, stormed 
and occupied the Chinese capital in 1860 and there imposed on the 
Chinese government a series of conditions which were henceforth to 
govern Sino-foreign relations. Viewing the peace treaties between China 
and the two Western Powers merely as a temporary lull in the ambitions 
of the Powers, Liu Daoheng now suggested to Du Wenxiu, the Yunnan 
rebel leader, that he should seize the psychological moment to entice to 
his side the two Western Powers with their superior modem weapons, 
and together, overthrow their common enemy, the Qing government. 
To that end, Liu offered himself as Du Wenxiu's emissary to Britain 
and France. 
Liu's memorial, the gist of which I have just outlined, bears the 
date October 1870. We do not know when, or even if, the memorial 
was actually submitted to Du Wenxiu, or the whereabouts of Liu at 
that time. The document does, however, carry a marginal note, 
allegedly by Du Wenxiu, praising the author's literary style and 
presentation of argument which, it avers, could not have been that 
of an 'ordinary pedantic scholar', and lauding him as 'a rare talent 
in troubled times'. But it made no comment on the proposal itself. 
In the memorial, Liu Daoheng explained that he had turned to Du 
Wenxiu because the man whom he regarded as some kind of adopted 
father through marriage, Liu Yinchang, another Moslem leader, called 
Syed Dawood by the British, was too small-minded to entertain his 
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proposal. This Liu Yinchang, at the time commanded the Moslem 
stronghold of Wusuo, near the Burmese border, was none other than 
the rebel leader, who for nine years had held the all-important district 
of Tengchong (also known by the British as Momien).32 However that 
may be, the next time we hear of Liu Daoheng, some ten months after 
the date of his memorial, he was in Burma as a member of the mission 
headed by Ma Silong, the father-in-law of Liu Yinchang. The aim of 
this mission was to seek British support in opening a direct trade route 
from Burma to Wusuo. The main route via Tengchong had already been 
rendered precarious by Qing government forces. The negotiations 
dragged on for some five months without result, so Ma Silong decided 
to return to Wusuo while Liu Daoheng remained in Burma.33 
It so happened that at this time, the King of Burma, against the 
wishes of the British imperial authorities there, was planning to send 
a mission to Britain.34 As there was some enmity between the Yunnan 
Moslems and the King of Burma over Burmese support of the Qing 
government,35 the local British authorities, finding themselves unable 
to stop the Burmese mission, seem to have decided to make use of Liu 
Daoheng (who had been hanging around and bothering them) to 
outshine the Burmese by setting him up as the head of a rival mission to 
London a few days in advance of the others.36 So, without fust 
informing London or obtaining permission, Liu Daoheng was trans-
formed into Prince Hassan and was hastily despatched to London via 
Calcutta at the expense of the Government of India, at the head of the 
so-called Panthay Mission. Leaving Rangoon at the beginning of April 
the mission duly reached the British capital on the last day of May 
1872, four days before the Burmese mission arrived. 
London was furious. The Secretary of State for India, the Duke of 
Argyll, refused to receive the mission, and the British authorities in 
India and Burma were reprimanded in no uncertain terms for having 
allowed it to proceed at all, let alone at government expense.37 The 
Under-Secretary of State at the India Office was not only instructed to 
find out the purpose of the mission, but was also charged with getting 
rid of it. Indeed, the bulk of the archives on this mission is concerned 
with how best to end it and how to reduce the cost of its upkeep until 
this could be effected. So annoyed was the Duke that, at his insistence, 
the total weekly allowance for the whole delegation, which was housed 
while in London on the attic floor of the Charing Cross Hotel in the 
Strand, was reduced from £73.16 to £61.8.9.38 
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The quickest way to get rid of these emissaries would have been to 
send them back the way they had come . But Liu Daoheng, sensing 
perhaps the government's impatience to see them go, insisted on 
returning via Turkey at the British government's expense, and the 
British reluctantly acceded to this request.3 9 The Sultan of Turkey, 
however, also refused to receive the mission. So after two fruitless 
weeks, the luckless emissaries had to resort to borrowing for their fares 
to return to Rangoon.4 0 
This whole affair, full as it was of comic twists, would have been 
long forgotten, had it not been for two documents in Chinese left 
behind with the India Office by Liu Daoheng. The fust, purporting to 
be a letter of allegiance from Du Wenxiu to Queen Victoria, was dated in 
the lunar calendar month 13 November-I I December 1871 while 
Liu Daoheng was in Burma and was the letter of accreditation for the 
two emissaries, Ma Silong and Liu Daoheng, described respectively as 
Du Wenxiu's wife's uncle and adopted son. But, actually, Ma Silong had 
gone back to Wusuo and absented himself from the mission; another 
young Moslem renamed Prince Yussuf by the British unofficially took 
his place . It was in this letter that Liu Daoheng was described for the 
first and only time as the adopted son of Du Wenxiu.41 
The second document, in two parts, is Liu Daoheng's address to the 
India Office in London. The fust part of this second document is a 
request for British military and financial support, in return for which 
Liu pledged the allegiance of the Moslem government at Dall. The 
second part of the document explains the significance of the offering of 
four cases of Dall marble which were being presented as a token of 
allegiance. It is on these two documents that the accusation of treason 
is based.42 
These incriminating documents are further supported by equally 
incriminating circumstantial evidence. I have already pointed out that 
the Yunnan Moslem Rebellion, though ethnically based and inspired, 
was not a racial conflict. Nor was it a religious one, although religion 
and the violation of religious practices were an added cause. Economic 
factors lay at the heart of the conflict. Such being the case, the rebel 
movement had no binding ideology but only the interests of different 
localities, which often varied as widely as they were separated geo-
graphically. The situation was not unlike that of the Arab countries 
in the present-day Middle East as I understand it. Though of the same 
people and of the same faith, ultimately it is individual, tribal and 
even personal interests which prevail. With the Moslems in Yunnan, 
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one can go further and say that after centuries of assimilation and 
absorption what still kept them apart from other Chinese was the 
economic and political discrimination directed against them. Resent-
ment against this may have been sufficient to kindle a revolt, but not 
always to sustain it, and certainly not to serve as a durable uniting force 
for Moslems of different areas. Since economic discrimination was 
their main grievance, the Moslems were vulnerable to being selectively 
bought over by the government, and this made it difficult for different 
districts to preserve any united front. This inability, the most important 
factor in the rebels' eventual defeat, was becoming apparent when Liu 
Daoheng wrote to Du Wenxiu. 
Furthermore, after centuries of assimilation and Confucian indoctrin-
ation, the majority of Yurman Moslems were very susceptible to 
government propaganda and its notion of loyalty and treason. So the 
ethnic element of the Rebellion became a weakness rather than a 
strength. By making the Moslem rebels out to be an enemy, not just 
of the government, but of the nation, the government successfully 
turned the suppression campaign into a racial war. How strong this 
sentiment about the ethnic element of the Rebellion was can be seen in 
the fact that some historians still consider as evidence of treason even 
the alleged existence of the 'Huijiao Guo' - the Islamic Kingdom, or 
'Pingnan Guo' - the Kingdom of Southern Tranquility, names given by 
foreigners to Du Wenxiu's government in DaJi.43 
Du Wenxiu distinguished himself by being the one leader able to 
see further than local and ethnic interests. He broadened and therefore 
consolidated the base of the rebel forces under his leadership by en-
listing the support of Han Chinese, as well as of other ethnic groups in 
the province.44 This explains why his forces were able to continue the 
struggle for another eleven years after the Moslems everywhere else in 
Yurman had either surrendered to or been destroyed by the Qing 
government forces. The ethnic element in the Rebellion was neverthe-
less skilfully exploited by the Qing government, to the great detriment 
of the rebel movement. 
Yet another weakness of the rebel forces was that their warfare was 
defensive rather than offensive. This was because their revolt sprang 
out of economic grievance, invariably local in nature, and they lacked 
social and political programmes and objectives such as the Taiping 
had had. By merely defending themselves locally, they waited to be 
attacked, and were isolated, weakened and eventually destroyed. In 
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this way, Liu Daoheng's advocacy of the need to fight the Qing govern-
ment with a view to overthrowing it, could have appealed to Du Wenxiu. 
Liu's proposal could also have made sense to Du Wenxiu for another 
reason. The two Western Powers, Britain and France, whose support 
Liu thought desirable, were not only two of the most powerful foreign 
presences in China, but were also the Powers in control of Yunnan's 
two foreign neighbours - Burma, and what was to become known as 
Indo-China. Though Britain's formal annexation of Upper Burma and 
the war by which France secured Tonkin were not to take place for 
another fifteen years, their intentions were already as clear as their 
influence was felt. Yunnan lay across the path to their goal in the 
interior of China. It was all-important in the schemes of both Western 
Powers, who were becoming increasingly active when the Yunnan 
Rebellion broke out. In February 1868, a French party under Captain 
Garnier visited Du Wenxiu in Dali. It was followed three months later 
by the visit to Tengchong of a British party led by Captain Sladen. 
The French had been rebuked by Du Wenxiu, who told them in 
unambiguous terms that they could do what they liked in Indo-China, 
but under no circumstances would their aggression be tolerated in 
Yunnan, or certainly not in that part of Yunnan under his control.45 
This rebuke undoubtedly helped to tum the French against the rebels 
and induced them to supply the Qing forces with weapons. As for 
Captain Sladen, he was tactfully stopped from proceeding further than 
Tengchong.46 
Dali was still at the height of its power when these foreigners made 
their appearance, but two years later, when Liu Daoheng made his 
proposal to Du Wenxiu in October 1870, the situation had completely 
changed. Soon their territory of forty-one prefectures and districts was 
to shrink to nine and be hemmed into one relatively poor and 
mountainous comer.47 In fact, what may be called the first tuming-
point of the Rebellion had occurred as far back as 1862 when the 
rebel forces under Ma Rulong and Ma Dexin had been lured by the 
Qing government into surrrender.48 Their betrayal made it possible 
for the government troops to regain control of the vast, rich and 
strategically vital central plains, cutting once and for all the rebels' 
lines of communication with lndo-China, whence the French were now 
pouring in military equipment in support of the government forces and 
their new Moslem allies.4 9 Even more importantly, the Qing govern-
ment could now not only throw all their military might at the 
remaining Moslem resistance under Du Wenxiu, but could also make 
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use of the new Moslem allies. In fact it was they who, now greatly 
strengthened with foreign weapons, served as the advance guard in the 
government's attack against their own kind, thus turning what was 
originally an ethnically inspired struggle into civil strife within the 
same ethnic group. The government simultaneously achieved its 
political as well as its military aims in this way. Indeed, desertion from 
the beleaguered camp of Du Wenxiu became increasingly more frequent 
from this time on.50 In such a situation the probability that Du Wenxiu 
could have changed his mind about contact with the foreign powers and 
be converted to Liu Daoheng's idea of appealing for foreign aid was, 
of course, quite high, and if he did, then the mission to London led by 
Liu Daoheng by way of Burma would be the only course open to him. 
I have now set out all the documentary and circumstantial evidence 
in favour of the treason theory, and it is incriminating evidence indeed. 
But having examined all this, and also other evidence which I have 
recently unearthed in the India Office archives in London and else-
where, I would like to suggest a quite different sequence of events. I 
will try to show that Liu Daoheng's mission to London was the 
machination of an ambitious and determined man, that had nothing 
to do with Du Wenxiu, and even less with the whole Moslem movement 
in Yunnan. The verdict of treason passed on Du Wenxiu is, in my view, 
both wrong and unjust. 
The story, as I see it, is a simple one. There is no evidence to prove 
that Du Wenxiu had seen, let alone approved, Liu Daoheng's 1870 
memorial. It is certain, however, that Liu Daoheng, after having failed 
in his mission with Ma Silong in persuading the British authorities in 
Burma to open a new trade route direct to Wusuo, once more toyed 
with the proposal he made to Du Wenxiu the previous year, and this 
happened to fit in with the plans of the British authorities in Burma. 
So, the so-called letter of allegiance by Du Wenxiu to Queen Victoria 
was, with its seals and all, manufacturered in Burma by Liu Daoheng. 
This interpretation is clearly borne out by the letter which Liu 
addressed to the India Office in London; the handwriting in both 
documents is identical. What is more, there is yet another document 
in Chinese in the India Office archives, again in the handwriting 
identical to that of the so-called Letter of Allegiance. It is a letter Liu 
Daoheng wrote to the Duke of Argyll on his return to Rangoon in 
February 1873.51 Liu Daoheng, no longer content with the label of 
adopted son of Du Wenxiu under which he had gone to London, now 
assumed the title of the second highest ranking official of the 
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administration under Du Wenxiu, again with all the necessary seals. He 
did not know that Du Wenxiu had died by poisoning himself upon 
the fall of Dall two months previously. 
In my view, this is the whole story. I would like, if I may, to take 
this opportunity to say a word in reply to some of the colleagues I 
have had the good fortune to meet in my travels outside China. While 
not disagreeing with my diagnosis of the Liu Daoheng episode, they 
insist that judgment of the historical role of Du Wenxiu and the 
Yunnan Moslem Rebellion hinges not on the truth or otherwise of Liu 
Daoheng's mission as it appears in the records. They contend that the 
issue is a much larger one - one of historical double standards. They 
point out that Du Wenxiu was condemned for doing no more, even if 
he did do it, than many other revolutionaries in modern times. Yet 
these have been praised for conspiring with their actual and potential 
enemies in their attempt to overthrow their own government often at 
great damage of their country. These colleagues further maintain that 
in order to save his people from extermination, Du Wenxiu would 
have been completely justified in doing what he was accused of having 
done. His actions would not have been a betrayal, except to 
chauvinistic feeling, which had itself already betrayed him and his 
people. 
I want to make it very clear that I do not subscribe to that 
proposition. I am also sure that the Moslems of Yunnan would not 
subscribe to it either. Nor indeed would have Du Wenxiu and those 
who perished with him, for instead of running for foreign protection, 
did they not choose rather to face up to the foreign guns which the 
Qing government brought against them, and fight and die as defenders 
of what they saw as a righteous cause? Du Wenxiu, and even Liu 
Daoheng, had not underestimated the intensions of the imperialist 
powers to make use of ethnic conflict as a divisive means to weaken the 
Chinese nation. History has proved that this mischief did indeed do 
China great harm. It is in this light that we should try to view any hasty 
judgement on Du Wenxiu and the Yunnan Moslem Rebellion he led, a 
judgement which speaks more of the political climate of the time in 
which it was made than of history. 
I am pleased, as no doubt you are too, that China has returned once 
more to an atmosphere which allows an historian like myself to 
examine facts as facts. I hope the few facts I have put before you will 
help towards the vindication of the name of Du Wenxiu and the cause 
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of the Rebellion he led, and to their rehabilitation - such as has 
happened with the rehabilitation of many who were wrongly accused 
during that unhappy period in China's recent past. I further hope that 
this re-interpretation may contribute to improve relations between 
ethnic groups in Yurman, so that the tragic events of the last century 
may never recur. 
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THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese 
residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, 
a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for 
all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable 
services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and 
Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of 
the Chinese Consulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts 
of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, 
of Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. 
From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated 
with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the 
responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over 
by the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since 
that date have been given under the auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: WJ'. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship 
and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China. 10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference 
to Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese Art. 
3 May 1934. 
Fourth: WJ'. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. lOMay 1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese 
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Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, China Today: With Special Reference to Higher 
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Seventh: A.F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism on China. 
17 May 1939. 
Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 
5 June 1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the 
Westerner. 29 May 1949. 
Tenth: W.G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy. 
5 June 1941. 
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Eleventh: D.B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 September 
1948.* 
Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 
19 March 1951. 
Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work. 
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Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Na"ow Lane: Some Observations on 
the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 1958. 
Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 
October 1959.* 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The 
GokienAge. 5 October 1960.* 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with Other 
Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. 1 August 1961. * 
Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese 
Linguistics. 22 November 1962. * 
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of Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 April 1970. • 
Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery 
of East Asia. 3 November 1971.* 
Thirty-third: Eugene Karnenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 6 September 
1972. 
Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: 
Views of Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 1973. • 
Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China. 
22 July 1974. 
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